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Abstract 
This paper explores how differences in prime ministers’ leadership styles may 
affect parliamentary influence in security policy.  Drawing on work on 
personality differences in political psychology, I argue leadership style is a 
critical but often-overlooked factor in the growing area of research on 
parliaments and foreign affairs. My key argument is that prime ministers vary 
in how they respond to and manage parliamentary involvement in security 
policymaking.  I propose Leadership Trait Analysis to capture prime ministers’ 
orientations toward parliamentary involvement and advance specific 
expectations for how personality traits translate into PM openness to 
parliamentary involvement, how active they will be in managing the process, 
and the effectiveness of their management. I examine the plausibility of my 
argument with intra-country comparisons of Turkish and UK prime ministers’ 
orientations toward parliament in specific cases of security policy.  More 
generally, this paper challenges more formal-institutional approaches to 
parliaments’ role in security policy.  A focus on prime ministers has an analytic 
advantage of bringing together some of the various factors (such as intraparty 
divisions and public opinion) to explain parliamentary influence in security 
policy. 
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Introduction 
The growing area of research on the role of parliaments in foreign and security 
policy challenges the long-held conventional wisdom that parliaments are 
insignificant players (for overviews, see Mello and Peters, this issue; Raunio, 2014; 
Raunio and Wagner, 2017).  Instead, studies demonstrate that parliaments can and 
have played a critical role in key security decisions. Parliaments, of course, are not 
always influential or even involved in security policy-making processes and 
contemporary research identifies a number of factors, or opportunity structures (Mello 
and Peters, this issue) that render parliamentary involvement and influence more 
likely.  These factors include the particular powers and levers held by parliaments, as 
parliamentary powers vary greatly across states (Mello, 2012; Peters and Wagner, 
2011; Wagner, 2006).  Other factors are the presence of a coalition government 
(Auerswald, 1999; Oktay, this issue; Palmer et al., 2004), intraparty divisions (Mello, 
2014), parliamentary partisan composition (Wagner et al., 2017), public opinion 
(Kesgin and Kaarbo, 2010; Reiter and Tillman, 2002), historical analogies that point 
to the importance of parliament to avoid disasters (Kaarbo and Kenealy, 2017), the 
development of political ‘conventions’ or expectations of parliamentary involvement 
(Strong, 2014; this issue) and the multilateral context of the security mission (Schade, 
this issue).  
Missing from this laundry list is the prime minister (PM), the most important 
political agent in parliamentary systems.  While some have noted the importance of 
PM management skills in parliamentary influence (Kaarbo and Kenealy, 2016; 
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Kesgin and Kaarbo, 2010), there has been little theoretical development or focused 
empirical exploration of the role of the PM in parliamentary-executive relations in 
foreign affairs.  This paper explores how differences in prime ministers (PMs) 
leadership styles may enhance or minimize parliamentary influence in security policy.  
Drawing on work on personality differences in political psychology, I suggest how 
key aspects of leaders’ beliefs, traits, orientations toward others, and management 
skills relate to the PM-parliamentary relationship in security affairs. I focus on PMs’ 
decisions to seek parliamentary support and to PMs’ management of parliamentary 
votes.   
While this paper uses a few empirical examples for foundation, the emphasis 
here is on conceptual development, not testing, and on suggestions for future research.  
The exploratory nature of this paper is a necessary step, given the lack of research in 
this area.  This paper provides a framework for future studies to investigate 
propositions suggested here.  My arguments are focused specifically on PMs, on 
parliamentary democracies, and on security policy. There are, of course, unique 
aspects to PMs – they both control and are accountable to parliaments in ways that 
differ from their presidential counterparts.  Security policy may also be distinct and 
PMs may be more important in security policy as it is arguably easier to move 
policymaking away from ‘normal politics’ (Owens and Pelizzo, 2009; Raunio and 
Wagner, 2017).  Yet my general points about the importance of leaders and how they 
manage policy making could theoretically apply to leaders in other types of political 
systems and to other policy areas.   
This paper proceeds by establishing the importance of leaders generally, and 
PMs more specifically, for security policymaking in parliamentary systems.  I then 
argue that PMs have particular agency in parliaments’ roles in security policy given 
	 4	
the ambiguity of that role and the undetermined nature of parliamentary voting.  My 
key argument, using examples (primarily from the UK and Turkey), is that PMs vary 
in how they respond to and manage parliamentary involvement in security 
policymaking.  A focus on the PM’s role in parliamentary influence is consistent with 
an agent-based process conception of policy making and critically challenges more 
formal approaches that privilege structures and institutional variables (Kaarbo, 2015).  
For this reason, this paper takes a psychological orientation, rather than drawing on 
the growing area of non-psychological research on political leadership (see, for 
example, ‘t Hart and Rhodes, 2015). I propose Leadership Trait Analysis as a 
particularly fruitful conceptual framework and method for capturing PMs’ 
orientations toward parliamentary involvement and advance specific expectations for 
how personality traits translate into PM openness to parliamentary involvement, how 
active they will be in managing the process, and how effective their management will 
be. This paper concludes by suggesting that a focus on PMs offers an analytic 
advantage of bringing together some of the various factors (such as public opinion 
and intraparty factions) to explain parliamentary influence, but does raise normative 
concerns about democratic processes.  
 
The importance of PMs and PM leadership styles in security policy1 
Who leads matters in states’ foreign policy, as demonstrated by decades of 
research and observations by leaders themselves. Former US Secretary of State Henry 
Kissinger once stated: ‘as a professor, I tended to think of history as run by imperial 
forces.  But when you see it in practice, you see the differences personalities make’ 
(quoted in Isaacson, 1992: 13). Leaders have incredible potential to impact foreign 
and security policy (see, for example, Byman and Pollack, 2001; Hermann and 
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Hagan, 1998; Horowitz and Stam, 2014; Jervis, 2013; Saunders, 2011; Weeks, 2012).  
‘State leaders play a pivotal role in balancing international imperatives with those 
arising from, or embedded in, domestic politics’ (Hermann and Hagan, 1998: 126). 
Leaders shape the intentions and strategies of their states and are themselves an 
important part of their countries’ diplomatic capabilities (Byman and Pollack, 2001). 
As humans, leaders are biased, emotional, motivated, and imperfect information 
processers who do not always rationally respond to and control their environments.  
Leaders may, for example, misjudge their own domestic political constraints (Evans, 
1993).  Leaders and their characteristics may be more significant to their states’ 
foreign policies under certain conditions, such as when systemic or domestic contexts 
are ambiguous, complex, uncertain or dynamic, when countries’ foreign policy 
choices involve value trade-offs or symbolic and emotional significance, and when 
decision making authority is concentrated and leaders sit in strategic positions in the 
policy making process (Byman and Pollack, 2001; Hermann, 1993, 2001).  
Although prime ministers may not enjoy the same degree of authority and 
institutional power as democratic presidents and authoritarian rulers, they are at the 
centre of the political system, where they too can influence processes and policy 
outputs.  Prime ministers can shape decision-making through their appointments of 
other cabinet ministers, by setting agendas, and by choosing with whom to consult 
(Blondel, 1980; Dowding, 2013; Dyson, 2016; Kaarbo, 1997; Kaarbo and Hermann, 
1998). As Strangio, ‘t Hart, and Walter note, prime ministers  
‘…are the drivers of collective decision making at the heart of 
government.  They are its principal public face and its chief ambassador 
abroad.  When adversity strikes, they are national crisis managers in 
chief.  Switching perennially between the front stage and the back stage 
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of politics, and between the community gathering and the international 
summit, they convene, mediate, broker, persuade, bargain and cajole for a 
living’ (Strangio, ‘t Hart, and Walter, 2013: 1-2). 
The debate over whether leaders matter is rather stale and it is essential to 
concentrate on how leadership and leaders’ characteristics shape states’ foreign and 
security policies (Byman and Pollack, 2001; Dyson, 2016; Hermann and Hagan, 
1998; Jervis, 2013; Shannon and Keller, 2007). Extant research offers a number of 
possibilities, including a focus on leaders’ beliefs about politics, how leaders 
represent foreign policy problems and define international situations, leaders’ 
orientations toward risk, various pathologies and neuroses in leaders’ psyches, 
leaders’ age, leaders’ cognitive biases, motivations, and perceptions, and leaders’ 
images of other countries (see, for example, Dolan, 2016; Horowitz, Khong, 1992; 
Levy, 2000; McDermott, 1998; McDermott and Stam, 2005; Post, 2014; Schafer and 
Walker, 2006; Sylvan and Voss, 1998; Ziv, 2013) Some research examines the 
commonalities that leaders, as humans, share.  Personality approaches, however, 
focus on differences across leaders.  A personality perspective on leadership style sees 
leaders, as agents of the state, responding to international and domestic challenges 
according to their personalities. Different personality profiles produce variation in 
their responses. 
Following other psychologically-oriented scholarship on political leadership 
style, I define personality as a ‘patterned relationship’ among cognition, affect, 
motivations and orientations toward interpersonal relationships (Post, 2003: 77).2 
Leaders’ personalities vary and their responses to constraints are contingent on their 
individual characteristics. Personalities are not idiosyncratic but nomothetic, with 
personality types systematically related to behavioral patterns.  Leaders’ personalities 
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are not static across time and situation.  Modern personality theory expects individual 
characteristics to interact with situational cues and structural demands and 
opportunities. The degree to which individuals respond to situational cues, incentives 
and constraints is itself a personality trait that varies across individuals, including 
political leaders (Funder, 2001; Hermann, 1987)  
 
PMs and parliaments’ role in security policy 
Indeed, PMs may vary, both across individuals and across decision-making 
episodes, in terms of how they respond to and manage parliamentary processes in 
security affairs.  This is important because the involvement of parliament in security 
policy is often constitutionally ambiguous.  Even when the constitutional requirement 
is clear or when PMs seek parliamentary approval, the outcome of the vote is not 
predetermined and PMs can influence how independent and challenging parliaments 
are vis-à-vis PMs’ preferences.  In these situations, PMs’ leadership styles—their 
preferences and their behaviours -- are conditioned by their personalities.   
Parliamentary debates and votes on security issues are often the result of 
decisions by the PM and cabinets to seek approval or allow for parliamentary input.  
Parliament’s role in security is often unclear.  Even in the U.S. political system, in 
which the legislative role is constitutionally prescribed and further codified in the 
1973 War Powers Resolution, presidents, members of Congress and legal experts 
have perennially debated the necessity of Congressional approval for the use of force.  
Most presidents who ask for a Congressional vote make clear they are doing so for 
political, not constitutional or legal reasons (Pevehouse and Howell, 2011).  Post Cold 
War Japan is another example of Constitutional and parliamentary constraints being 
successfully challenge by individual PMs (Hirata, 2016). 
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The ambiguity of a legislative role in security affairs is present in many 
parliamentary systems (Mello and Peters, this issue).  The range of war powers varies 
considerably across parliaments (Peters and Wagner, 2011, 2014) but even when 
parliamentary approval is codified in legislation, there may be disagreement about 
when and how parliamentary involvement is to be triggered.  In the Netherlands, for 
example, a new constitutional article (Article 100.1) was established in 2000 to ensure 
greater parliament parliamentary role in the deployment of Dutch troops.  This 
constitutional change was part of an evolving doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty 
over peacekeeping missions, yet ‘many debates were fought over the exact premises 
of this doctrine, and over the exact phrasing of government obligations’ (Hoekema, 
2004: 76).  In 2006 and early 2007, there was still uncertainty, and elite contestation, 
over the necessity for parliamentary approval to send troops to southern Afghanistan 
upon NATO’s request (Deutsch, 2005; Hoekema, 2006; Kaarbo 2012). 
When there is no constitutional basis for parliamentary involvement, there is 
even more scope for PMs to decide if and when to involve parliament.  In the UK 
system for example, foreign affairs and particularly security policy is the cabinet’s 
Royal Prerogative – ‘the residue of discretionary or arbitrary authority, which at any 
given time is legally left in the hands of the Crown’, now passed to the executive 
(Dicey, 1959: 24). The authority to deploy the UK’s armed forces, constitutionally, 
resides in the collective responsibility of the cabinet, led by the PM. Any involvement 
of the House of Commons is in PMs gift to grant.  Most PMs have not sought 
parliamentary involvement.  As Strong (2014: 5) notes, the Commons ‘held a 
substantive vote over military action on just one occasion during the 20th century, 
over the Korean War.’ PM Tony Blair made the unusual decision in 2003 to seek 
support for the Iraq war with a substantive vote by parliament but he did so 
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unwillingly.  Throughout 2002 and up through January 2003, Blair maintained that 
‘he would decide and then parliament would discuss, but not vote on, war with 
Iraq…[refusing] for many months to back down on the procedural point’ (Strong, 
2014: 6). When he eventually conceded this point, ‘by making the Iraq question into a 
confidence motion, Blair forced Labour MPs who opposed war but otherwise 
supported the government to choose between the two’ (Strong, 2014: 7; see also 
Strong, 2017a).  The UK’s military missions in Afghanistan were never subject to a 
vote between the original deployment in 2001 and continued operations through 2010.  
The 2011 deployment in Libya was only authorised post-hoc by the Commons. In 
addition to Afghanistan and Libya, PM David Cameron requested approval from the 
House of Commons for use of military force in Syria (2013 and 2015) and against 
Islamic State in Iraq (2014).  In only one instance (the Syrian vote in 2013) did 
parliament not support the PM’s preference (Gaskarth, 2016; Kaarbo and Kenealy, 
2016; Mello, 2017; Strong, 2014). 
Parliamentary involvement in UK security policy may have become a political 
convention, as Strong (2014) and others have argued, but this convention is a product 
of successive decisions by the PM to allow the House of Commons to have a say. 
Other pressures may be important in these decisions (such as public opinion and 
political parties divided and supportive of parliamentary involvement), but it is up to 
the PM to respond to those pressures. Lindsay (1993: 613) makes a similar point, 
arguing that U.S. President Bush’s reluctance to request Congressional authorization 
for the Iraq war in 1991 stemmed from Bush’s perception it was too much to risk 
Congress not approving. Whether and when leaders respond to pressures to seek 
legislative approval, and in what way, is conditioned by their leadership styles, in 
ways discussed below.   
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When parliaments are asked to (or themselves initiate) a debate and vote on a 
matter of foreign affairs, PMs also vary in the way they manage the parliamentary 
process. Even in cases in which parliamentary involvement is constitutionally 
ordained, PMs have agency in the process and can affect the outcome of the vote.  In 
this way, they influence how independent a role parliament plays in security and in 
the end, if parliament challenges PMs’ preferences.  PMs may choose to play a lead in 
disciplining their party (and perhaps their coalition partner if the cabinet is a 
multiparty one), they may delegate discipline to others, or they may choose to remain 
above the political fray.  In the UK House of Commons vote on Syria in 2013, for 
example, PM Cameron was visibly surprised at the outcome (which went contrary to 
his preference) and was criticized for recalling Parliament in a haphazard manner, 
attempting to rush through a vote before the UN inspectors completed their work, 
refusing to disclose comprehensively the legal advice received by the UK 
Government, and not doing enough to shore up support from many wavering 
backbenchers.  These were strong indicators that he was overconfident and 
underestimated the opposition (Kaarbo and Kenealy, 2016; Rigby, 2013).   
In a similar case, Turkish PM Gül and soon-to-be PM Erdoğan3 were surprised 
when, in 2003, the Turkish parliament declined to support the U.S. request to use 
Turkey as a base for operations in the Iraq War.  This outcome was highly unusual in 
Turkish politics and was against Erdoğan’s and much of the ruling Justice and 
Development party’s preference.  The vote was influenced by the leadership’s 
inconsistency and poor management skills.  So confident that their preference would 
prevail, the leaders did not enforce party discipline (Çuhadar et al., 2017b; Kesgin and 
Kaarbo, 2010; Robins, 2003; Taydaş and Özdamar, 2013).  This was in stark contrast 
to the Turkish parliament’s approval of the deployment of troops in the 1991 Gulf 
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War.  In that case, there was clear opposition to President Özal who supported a 
strong alliance with the United States against Iraq who acted more like a PM. In 
addition to conducting secret negotiations with the United States and spearheading the 
process to approve U.S. requests, Özal even argued that as President, he was the Chief 
of the Army and therefore empowered with the mandate of parliament to authorize 
Turkish troops when parliament was in recess (Çuhadar et al., 2017b).  Özal’s 
orientation to parliament stands in stark contrast to that of President Gül and PM 
Erdoğan in 2003.  Özal pushed and persuaded members of parliament to change a 
previous vote granting him permission (not power) to declare war to vote for 
unconditional authorization.  In he end, the Turkish parliament allowed the stationing 
of foreign forces in Turkey, in line with Özal’s preferences (Çuhadar et al., 2017b; 
Hale, 2000).  This comparison illustrates remarkable differences in leaders’ 
orientations toward parliamentary involvement in security policy. 
PMs’ strategies for managing (or not) parliamentary procedures and votes are 
undoubtedly influenced by many factors (Strong, this issue), including intraparty 
divisions and the perception of what the outcome of the vote will be, but, as these 
examples indicate, leadership style is a plausible variable independent of these other 
factors and as an intervening variable in PMs orientation towards parliament.  PMs, 
for example, may differ in their overall involvement with parliament and they may 
differ in how they react to intraparty politics.  They may also vary in the extent to 
which they engage in denial of opposition or wishful thinking that the vote will be in 
their favour.  These differences, I argue, stem from personality traits. 
 
 
 
	 12	
Leadership Trait Analysis 
Among the numerous ways for conceptualising leader personalities, Margaret 
Hermann’s Leadership Trait Analysis (LTA) is particularly suited to explore which 
individual characteristics are most promising for future research on PMs’ orientations 
toward parliament in security policy.  The LTA framework is one of the most 
prominent approaches to the study of political leaders’ personalities.  First developed 
by Hermann (1980), LTA has been used to study the personality and leadership style 
of many world leaders.   
LTA research has demonstrated that its seven personality traits – belief in 
ability to control events, conceptual complexity, need for power, distrust of others, in-
group bias, self-confidence, and task orientation (see Table 1) – systematically link to 
leaders’ propensity to challenge or respect constraints in their environments, their 
openness to information and advice, the structure of their advisory systems, the 
quality of decision making processes, and the policies leaders choose for their country 
or organization (see, for example, Dyson, 2006; Hermann, 2003; Kille and Scully, 
2003; Schafer and Crichlow, 2010). According to Hermann, the seven traits combine 
in particular ways to produce specific leader behavioural propensities.  Compared to 
other approaches to leaders’ personalities, LTA is a more composite approach, 
combining elements of leaders’ beliefs, motives, traits, and style. It incorporates 
insights from motive theory (McClelland, 1961; Winter, 1973) with its need for 
power and task orientation traits.	
Table 1. Personality Characteristics in Leadership Trait Analysis 
LTA Trait Description 
Belief in Ability to 
Control Events 
Perception of own degree of control over political world 
Need for Power Interest in developing, preserving, or reinstituting own 
power 
Self-Confidence  Notion of self-importance, and of capacity to take on 
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Source:  Çuhadar et al. (2017a), drawing on Hermann, 2003. 
 
LTA research infers personality characteristics from leaders’ words and has 
demonstrated that this can be done reliably, that it produces valid assessments, and 
that these assessments confidently explain how leaders make decisions and the 
particular policies they choose.  This research is systematic with standard coding rules 
and a computer program to process speeches into leader profiles.4 As Schafer notes, 
‘there is actually plenty of evidence that supports the effectiveness of using prepared 
speech acts as psychological indicators’ (2015: 5). 
LTA has generated an expansive area of research.  It has been used to study 
the personalities of many leaders, including U.S. presidents and presidential advisors, 
British PMs, sub-Saharan African leaders, Iranian leaders, Israeli PMs, Soviet 
Politburo members, and heads of international organizations such as the European 
Union and the United Nations (see, for example, Crichlow, 1998; Dyson, 2006, 2009, 
2016; Foster and Keller, 2014; Hermann, 1984, 1987, 2003; Keller, 2005a, 2005b; 
Kille and Scully, 2003; Mastors, 2000; Preston, 2001; Schafer and Crichlow, 2010; 
Shannon and Keller, 2007; Taysi and Preston, 2001; Van Esch and Swinkels, 2015). 
This research has shown that leaders’ personality traits do indeed vary and that its 
seven personality traits systematically link to policies leaders choose for their country 
or organization. LTA traits also have been linked to decision-making processes.  
Dyson, for example, convincingly demonstrated that Tony Blair’s low complexity, 
high need for power, and high belief in his ability to control events was seen in his 
political environment  
Conceptual Complexity Ability to distinguish complexities of political life 
In-group Bias 
 
Belief that own group constitutes center of political world 
Distrust of Others Suspicions, skepticism, worry of others outwith own group 
Task Focus Focus on problem solving (achievement motivated) vs. 
building relationships (affiliation motivated) 
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‘proactive policy orientation, internal locus of control in terms of shaping events, a 
binary information processing and framing style, and a preference to work through 
tightly held processes in policy making’ (Dyson, 2006: 303).  
LTA research has also demonstrated profound effects of personalities on 
decision making processes in terms of leaders’ propensities’ to challenge or respect 
constraints in their environments and their openness to information.  In other words, 
leaders with different traits are expected to relate to their context, institutional setting, 
costs and benefits of various policy options, and other agents in theoretically 
meaningful and predictable ways. Put simply, leaders vary in how they respond to 
their environments.  Some confront structural barriers and pressures; others defer to or 
work within them (see, for example, Çuhadar et al., 2017a, 2017b; Dyson, 2007; 
Hermann, 1983, 1987, 1993; Hermann and Kegley, 1995; Keller, 2005a, 2005b; 
Shannon and Keller, 2007). Variation in responsiveness, or sensitivity, to the 
environment is captured by a variety of comparative terms, such as ‘crusader vs 
pragmatist’, ‘ideologue vs. opportunist’, ‘directive vs. consultative,’ ‘dominators vs. 
consensus seekers’ and ‘ideologically driven vs. contextually sensitive’ (see, for 
example, Dowding, 2013; Hermann and Kegley, 1995; Shannon and Keller, 2007).5  
As Keller notes, ‘constraint challengers and respecters…represent ideal types.  Some 
leaders resemble these vivid portraits, but most leaders fall in between these two 
poles.  Nevertheless, leaders generally exhibit a tendency toward one or the other 
profile’ (Keller, 2005b: 840; see also Keller, 2005a).  Leaders’ orientations to 
structures are based on personality differences captured by LTA.  Orientation to 
constraints also acts as an intervening variable for other traits.  For leaders who 
challenge constraints, for example, their own beliefs and style will be more reflected 
in policymaking processes and foreign policy choices.   
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  Researchers differ as to which LTA traits are, individually or in combination, 
most indicative of leaders’ orientations to constraints.  Hermann (2003), for example, 
argues that leaders who have a high belief in their ability to control events and a high 
need for power are expected to challenge constraints. Hermann (2003) also argues 
that conceptual complexity and self-confidence predict leaders’ openness to 
information.  Some studies have found support for these combinations of traits 
producing different patterns of leaders’ sensitivity to their environments (Dyson, 
2007, 2016; Kille and Scully, 2003; Schafer and Crichlow, 2010). 
Keller (2005a, 2005b) constructed a different composite for constraint 
challengers and respecters.  Like Hermann, he included need for power, but combined 
this with leaders’ task emphasis, distrust, and nationalism (in-group bias) traits.  
Constraint challengers are 1) task-oriented, with ‘a more directive management style, 
viewing others as tools to be used to accomplish the all-important mission rather than 
as actors with legitimate views that must be respect or accommodated’ (Keller, 2005a: 
210; see also Blake and Mouton, 1964); 2) high in need for power, seeing politics as a 
zero-sum game and willing ‘to circumvent institutional mechanisms of accountability 
and power-sharing’ (Keller, 2005a: 211; see also Winter, 1973); 3) high in distrust 
with suspicions of others, enhanced threat perceptions, and prone to take risks (Keller, 
2005a; see also Driver, 1977; Levy, 1997); and 4) high in nationalism (or in-group 
bias) in which institutional constraints are circumvented when ‘leaders fear 
exploitation by adversaries’ or ‘view domestic opponents as enemies’ (Keller, 2005a; 
see also Druckman, 1968).  Keller related the composite of these four traits to policy 
outcomes and policy processes.  For the latter, he derived specific hypotheses for 
constraint challengers and respecters and traced the decision making process of 
constraint challengers and respecters, finding considerable plausibility for his 
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hypotheses. Shannon and Keller (2007) found that the LTA trait distrust is a 
particularly important element of leaders’ orientations toward international norms.   
 Keller and Foster (2012) combine two LTA traits -- the belief in the ability to 
control events and self-confidence – to create a scale indicating leaders’ locus of 
control.  The higher the leaders are in both, they argue, the more they have an internal 
locus of control and ‘…when faced with difficult political and economic conditions, 
will be much more confident in their ability to take the reins and manipulate the 
environment to protect their political position’ (Keller and Foster, 2012: 587-8). They 
expect leaders with external locus of control to respect the constraints that domestic 
problems put on them and ‘will have little confidence in their ability to reverse these 
conditions’ (Keller and Foster, 2012: 587).  Their study of U.S. presidents facing 
economic problems and declining presidential approval ratings generally support 
these expectations.  Keller and Foster’s locus of control construct relates to what Lord 
David Owen refers to as the ‘Hubris Syndrome’.  Hubris includes, among other 
indicators, excessive confidence and an exaggerated belief in what they, the leaders, 
can personally achieve (Owen and Davidson, 2009).  We would expect leaders high in 
hubris to challenge constraints. 
 
Leadership Trait Analysis and PMs’ orientations to parliaments 
From this research on what types of leaders challenge or respect constraints, 
including institutional procedures and norms of decision making, we can derive 
expectations about PM orientations toward parliamentary influence in security 
policies.  These involve three questions:  Is the PM open to parliamentary 
involvement, are they actively engaged in the management of the parliamentary 
process and, if active, how effective are they in the management of that process?  For 
	 17	
each question, there are theoretical bases for linking PM orientations to parliament to 
some LTA characteristics.  These links are presented in Table 2, where there is 
sufficient theoretical basis. These PM orientations can, in turn, affect the role of 
parliament in security policies. 
 
 
 
Table 2. LTA Personality Characteristics & PM Orientation to Parliament 
 
*Insufficient basis for expectation.   
 
The first question concerns which PMs are most likely to seek parliamentary 
support and which are most likely to challenge parliamentary influence.  Some leaders 
may dismiss parliamentary constraints as a distraction, while others believe it prudent 
or normatively ideal to be open to parliamentary input. Those that will challenge or 
ignore parliament are PMs who have a high belief in the ability to control events, a 
high need for power, a task focus on solving problems, have high levels of distrust, 
in-group bias and self-confidence, and have low conceptual complexity. PMs with a 
low belief in their ability to control events, a low need for power, a task focus on 
building relationships, low levels of distrust, in-group bias, and self-confidence, and 
LTA Trait Open to 
Parliamentary  
Involvement? 
Active 
Management  
of Process? 
Effective 
Management 
of Process? 
High Belief in Ability to 
Control Events 
No Yes * 
High Need for Power No Yes Yes 
High Self-Confidence No Yes No 
High Conceptual 
Complexity 
Yes Yes Yes 
In-group Bias No No * 
Distrust of Others No No * 
Problem Task Focus 
(achievement motivated) 
No No * 
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high conceptual complexity will more likely seek parliamentary approval or work 
constructively with parliament if parliament’s role is unambiguous. Which of these 
traits, individually or in combination, are more important indicators of PMs’ 
orientations to parliaments, is an open question, given the lack of consensus in 
previous research. 
  LTA research on leader traits and decision-making processes also provide some 
insights on how PMs will manage the process and how much they will become 
involved.  This second factor is important for leaders who choose or welcome a 
parliamentary role and for leaders who have no choice for parliamentary involvement.  
Generally, leaders are more involved themselves if they have a strong belief in their 
ability to control events, have a high need for power, high self-confidence, and have 
high conceptual complexity (Çuhadar et al., 2017b; Dyson, 2006, 2016; Fodor and 
Smith, 1982; Hermann, 2003; Preston 2001; Preston and ‘t Hart, 1999).  Leaders will 
delegate management of the decision making process or avoid the process if they have 
high distrust, high in-group bias, and have a problem-focused task orientation.   
  Combining the first two questions (columns 2 and 3 in Table 2) on these critical 
questions of openness to parliamentary involvement and active management of the 
process, we can derive expectations about parliamentary influence in security policy. 
Parliamentary influence in security policy is least likely when PMs are not open to 
their involvement and when they actively manage the process (the ‘no’s in column 2 
and the ‘yes’s in column 3 in Table 2).  Parliamentary influence in security policy is 
most likely when leaders have opposite scores for belief in ability to control events, 
need for power, and conceptual complexity and are thus open to parliamentary 
involvement and do not actively manage the process.  The other combinations of traits 
would lead mixed messages regarding parliamentary involvement.  Leaders might be 
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opposed to involvement but are then hands-off the process or are open to involvement 
and then direct the process.  In these situations, the influence of parliament would 
hinge on other factors or on how the PM directed the process.  We would expect 
leaders who are open to parliamentary involvement and then are actively involved 
(those with high self confidence) to be able to use the authority of the office of the 
PM to address and diminish parliamentary challenges to PM preferences.   These are 
merely speculations requiring empirical investigation but they flow, theoretically, 
from previous work on leadership styles and leader personality. 
 
  Finally, we can also speculate on how effective PMs will be in the 
management process  (addressing the third question, also presented in Table 2).  
Certain personality traits, for example, are related to faulty decision-making processes 
such as wishful thinking and misperceptions. Schafer and Crichlow (2010) found that 
the combination of higher self-confidence than complexity was significantly related to 
faulty decision processes and Brummer (2016) found that British PMs with high self-
confidence were associated with foreign policy fiascos.  Van Esch’s (2014) study of 
EU leaders in the Euro crisis indicates that those with low complexity were more 
likely to rigidly stick to prior beliefs.  Winter’s (2010) work on motive theory (which 
is related to LTA’s need for power and task orientation traits) suggests that political 
leaders who are high in the need for power (relative to their need for achievement and 
affiliation) are more successful than leaders who are high in their need for affiliation.  
Interesting, this differs from business leaders who are more successful if they score 
high on need for achievement.  Winter’s research suggests that political leaders with 
strong motives for achievement find politics frustrating, whereas power-motivated 
leaders enjoy the give and take of political processes (Winter, 2010).  Brummer’s 
(2016) study is consistent with this – leaders low in power were associated with 
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policy fiascos.  Ferguson and Barth (2002) found that U.S. governors with high scores 
on power and achievement were more likely to be successful in achieving their goals 
in the legislature.  From this work, we can expect that leaders who are less power-
oriented, low in complexity, and high in self-confidence will be more likely to 
blunder the process through mismanagement and/or underestimating the degree of 
opposition in parliament.6  This type of PM ineffectively opens the door for greater 
parliamentary influence.   
  Carefully designed studies are needed to further explore the explanatory value 
and accuracy of this approach and the hypotheses embedded in Table 2.  We can, 
however, draw on previous studies of LTA personality profiles and leaders’ 
interactions with parliaments over security policy to initially assess the plausibility of 
these theoretically-based expectations.  Çuhadar et al. (2017b), for example, profiled 
Turkish President Özal and PM Erdoğan.  These leaders faced similar international 
and domestic constraints.  The United States government was pressuring Turkey, in 
both instances, to support its planned intervention in Kuwait (1991) and in Iraq 
(2003), respectively.  In both cases, single party governments controlled the 
parliament and the leaders’ (Özal and then Erdoğan) personal preferences were to 
cooperate with the United States, despite public and military opposition.   
  As noted above, however, the executive-legislative interactions in the two 
cases were very different.  Although the leaders had no choice but to accept 
parliamentary involvement (constitutionally, the Turkish Grand Assembly must 
approve the stationing of foreign troops on Turkish soil), the degree of management 
and the effectiveness of the management varied considerably across the two cases. 
Özal was very much involved, dominating parliamentary deliberations and he 
effectively managed the process to secure his preferred outcome.  Erdoğan, on the 
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other hand, remained in the background during parliamentary processes and poorly 
managed the process, so confident he was that parliament would support his position 
(Çuhadar et al., 2017b; Kesgin and Kaarbo, 2010; Robins, 2003; Taydaş and 
Özdamar, 2013).  Çuhadar et al. (2017b) attribute these different processes and 
outcomes to the differences in the leaders’ personalities and styles.  The key 
differences in their LTA profiles were for the traits self-confidence and complexity 
(with Özal higher than Erdoğan for both) and power (with Özal lower than Erdoğan).  
The leaders did not different significantly on the other four LTA traits.  This 
comparison supports the expectation in Table 2 for self-confidence and complexity, 
but not for power.   
 We can also use Dyson’s (2006) LTA profile of Tony Blair and Strong’s 
(2017b) comparison with David Cameron’s LTA profile to assess how differences in 
their leadership styles played out in the House of Common’s role in UK security 
policy.7  As previously noted, although Blair eventually asked parliament for approval 
for UK participation in Iraq, he did so very reluctantly, arguing for a good while that 
parliamentary involvement was not necessary (Strong, 2014, 2017a).  In contrast, 
Cameron sought parliamentary approval for a number of UK military missions.  
These two PMs’ management of parliamentary involvement also differed.  While 
Blair effectively made the Iraq vote into a confidence motion and passionately 
delivered an impressive rhetorical case, Cameron was less involved.  In the 2013 vote 
on Syria, for example, Cameron was arguably overconfident and underestimated the 
opposition to his preference (Gaskarth, 2016; Kaarbo and Kenealy, 2016; Rigby, 
2013).  As a result, he mismanaged the vote and became the first UK PM since 1782 
to have his preference on a security matter over-ruled by parliament. He then quickly 
conceded the point, although technically most MPs had actually voted, in principle, 
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for a UK military response against Syria.8  It is difficult to imagine Blair losing or 
conceding in this way.   
  Can the differences between these two PMs’ orientations toward parliament’s 
role in security policy be captured by LTA profiling?  Comparing the two leaders, 
Blair is higher than Cameron in his belief in the ability to control events and need for 
power.  Cameron is higher than Blair in his complexity, self-confidence, and in-group 
bias (Dyson, 2006; Levine and Young, 2014; Strong, 2017b).  The two leaders are 
fairly similar for task orientation and distrust of others. Strong (2017b) argues that, 
compared to Blair, Cameron is more likely to respect constraints and more open to 
information, given their LTA profiles.  These differences are consistent with some of 
the expectations presented above.  Blair’s higher belief in his ability to control events 
and his higher need for power may explain his lower openness to parliamentary 
involvement and his higher level of active involvement.  Blair’s higher need for 
power may also explain his more effectiveness.  In addition, Cameron’s 
comparatively higher complexity may explain his more openness to parliamentary 
involvement, his in-group bias may explain his level of involvement, and his higher 
self-confidence may explain his ineffective management.  The differences between 
the two leaders’ complexity do not relate to their activity and effectiveness, as 
expected.  Blair’s lower self-confidence does explain his high level of involvement as 
expected (although Blair has a higher than average self-confidence score compared to 
other leaders, but not to Cameron).   
 
Conclusion 
The examples of Turkish and UK security policy demonstrate plausibility and 
potential for this paper’s framework to investigate PMs’ orientations to parliamentary 
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involvement in security affairs.   This framework is built on a psychological-based 
personality approach to leadership style and offers a rigorous and theoretically 
grounded path for exploring how PMs respond to parliaments.  The propositions put 
forward here are only suggestive and future research should focus on exploring which 
personality traits -- individually and in combinations -- distinguish PM orientations to 
parliament and how PM orientations affect the role of parliament in security policy.  
While this framework is not necessarily unique to PMs or to security issues, the 
theoretical foundations, prior empirical research, and the examples referenced in this 
paper all point to fruitful contributions from the application of this framework to this 
topic.   
Prime ministers are important agents in the security policy of states with 
parliamentary systems.  If the role of parliaments in security policy is increasing in 
significance and if the relationship between executives and legislatures is being 
recalibrated in modern parliamentary democracies (Wagner et al., 2017), the 
executive, led by the PM, has considerable authority to interpret, manage, and even 
manipulate this relationship. Parliamentary powers, both formal and informal, in 
security policy are, in Keller’s terms (2005a, 2005b) potential constraints, rather than 
direct constraints, and ‘are open to multiple interpretations or can be overcome in the 
short term (though the longer-term political or personal consequences may be very 
serious)’ (Keller, 2005b: 838). ‘Contrary to prevailing structure-based theories, 
potential constraints in any political environment must be activated by leaders’ 
responsiveness to them before they can influence policy behavior’ (Keller, 2005b: 
836-7).9   
This approach challenges more institutional perspectives and is consistent with 
this Special Issue’s argument that parliamentary influence on security policy is not 
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narrowly determined by formal constitutional powers.  PMs, as agents, are important 
interpreters and managers of parliament’s role and can play a key role in activating, 
and suppressing, the various informal sources of parliamentary influence discussed by 
Mello and Peters (this issue) and other articles in this special issue.  Furthermore, 
focus on PMs as human agents has an analytic advantage of bringing together the 
various opportunity structures in the growing area of research on parliamentary 
influence in foreign policy.  Current research suggests a number of factors, including 
intraparty divisions, critical junctures, trends of politicization, and public opinion, 
which influence how parliament affects security policies.    From an agent-based 
foreign policy analysis perspective (see Kaarbo, 2015), these other factors are 
important but are filtered through leaders’ actions and understanding.  How the PM 
and other key political leaders perceive, believe, and act on intraparty divisions or 
public opinion, for example, are the critical mechanisms for translating these factors 
into the policy making process and policy outcomes.   
PMs’ orientations towards parliaments also relates to this special issue’s 
second theme on the effects of parliamentary involvement.  Whether or not 
parliaments constrain war-prone executives to produce more peaceful policies, for 
example, may depend on the content of the PMs personal beliefs (some are more war-
prone than others), on any bargains the PM makes with parliament, and on the degree 
to which PM’s even allow parliamentary involvement.  In other words, the outcomes 
of parliamentary involvement are intrinsically connected to the process of 
parliamentary involvement and a focus on leadership style puts the PM’s management 
of the process front and centre in the analysis. 
Finally, PMs’orientations toward parliamentary involvement in security policy 
addresses the third theme of this special issue on the politics of security.  While 
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parliamentary involvement may foster public debate, the PM can be an important 
agent to trigger or suppress the ‘normalization’ of security policy.  This does raise 
normative concerns about democratic processes.  If parliaments’ functions are to 
represent the people and to serve as a check on the executive, then PMs who ignore or 
manipulate parliamentary involvement contribute to a democratic deficit.  This is 
particularly true in parliamentary systems where the central leader, the PM, is not 
directly elected.  This paper suggests that some PMs are more likely to contribute to 
such a deficit than others. 
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1This section draws directly from my research with Esra Çuhadar, Baris Kesgin, and 
Binnur Özkeçeci-Taner er (Çuhadar et al., 2017a, 2017b). 
2 Italics in original.   
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3 Erdoğan was banned from running for or holding political office after his arrest in 
1998 for allegedly inciting religious hatred by reciting a poem.  After a constitutional 
amendment, he was elected in a by-election to parliament on 9 March 2003 and 
became prime minister.  Throughout the lead-up to the Iraq War, Erdoğan operated 
behind the scenes as party leader. 
4 For an excellent recent review of at-a-distance analysis, including discussion of 
validity issues, see Schafer (2015).  
5 For a connection to literature on management science, see Keller, 2005a, 2005b. 
6 These propositions must be considered preliminary and tentative given the mixed 
results in previous research.  One study (Brummer, 2016), for example, found that 
high complexity was associated with policy fiascos.   
7 Strong’s (2017b) profile of Cameron is largely consistent with Levine and Young 
(2014). 
8 Because MP votes were divided over two motions (a Labour-sponsored motion and 
a Conservative-sponsored motion), neither motion passed, although both motions 
supported some military action (the only difference being prerequisite conditions in 
the Labour motion).   
9 Italics in original. 
